Fix nite pure strategy sets S 1 ; : : : ; S n , and let S = S 1 : : : S n . In our model of a random game the agents' payo s are statistically independent, with each agent's payo uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in the dual of IR S . For given nonempty T 1 S 1 ; : : : ; T n S n we give a computationally implementable formula for the mean number of Nash equilibria in which each agent i's mixed strategy has support T i . The formula is the product of two expressions, where the rst is the expected number of totally mixed equilibria for the truncated game obtained by eliminating pure strategies outside the sets T i , and the second may be construed as the \probability" that such an equilibrium remains an equilibrium when the strategies in the sets S i n T i become available. The expected number of totally mixed equilibria for the truncated game is shown to be at least as large as 2 ?3p=2 times the square root of the maximal number of totally mixed equlibria (for generic payo s) where p = p 1 + : : : + p n is the sum of the dimensions p i = jT i j ? 1 of the simplices of mixed strategies with support T i . From this it follows that, in certain senses, the mean number of totally mixed equilibria grows exponentially as the size of the game increases. The expected number of Nash equilibria of all sorts is obtained by summing over supports. Numerical results which suggest certain monotonicity conjectures are presented. The distribution of equilibrium mixed strategy vectors is characterized.
Introduction
The applicability of Nash equilibrium, and its variants and re nements, is limited in many ways by the complexity of the concept. If equilibrium is reached through a process of introspection, then it is necessary for each agent to compute at least her strategy in the equilibrium that is chosen, and possibly much more, depending on the principles that are thought to guide equilibrium selection. In a broader range of applications equilibrium is regarded as a stable pattern of social behavior that might result from evolution or learning. Convergence to equilibrium can occur without complicated calculations on the part of individuals, but although the burden of computational complexity is displaced to the level of the strategic adjustment process, it is still limiting.
This paper contributes to the quanti cation of these limitations using the methods and outlook of theoretical computer science. Speci cally, we propose a model of a random normal form game for given ( nite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense. We give a formula for the mean number of Nash equilibria that have a particular support (1) . The formula involves an integral that may be evaluated numerically without di culty. We give a theoretical lower bound for this integral in terms of combinatorically de ned quantities. This bound implies that, in a variety of senses, the mean number of equilibria grows exponentially with the size of the game.
Our work has the following features and consequences: (A) The mean of the sum of a nite collection of random variables (no matter how correlated) is the sum of the means, so one may derive the expected number of Nash equilibria of all sorts from our formula by simple summation. (B) The formula is the product of two factors, one of which is the expected number of totally mixed (2) Nash equilibria for the truncated game obtained by eliminating pure strategies outside the support, while the second may be interpreted as the \probability" that a totally mixed equilibrium of the truncated game remains a Nash equilibrium when the strategies outside the support are available. (C) The analysis depends on the application of methods from the mathematical literature on what are known as \sparse" systems of polynomial equations, and from a literature (cf. Edelman and Kostlan (1995) ) that computes mean numbers of roots for a variety of polynomial systems. A companion paper (McLennan (1999) ) explores the key calculation as it would most naturally be posed in these literatures. In particular, we will apply a formula developed there that generalizes previous results by Kostlan (1993) , Shub and Smale (1993) , and Rojas (1996) . (D) The concept of Nash equilibrium for the given support, applied to the given distribution over games, induces a measure on the space of mixed strategy vectors, and (1) The support of a Nash equilibrium speci es the pure strategies that are assigned positive probability. (2) A Nash equilibrium is totally mixed if it assigns positive probability to all pure strategies. { 1 { the mean given by our formula is the total mass of this measure. In fact we are able to characterize this measure completely. The measure is the product of measures on the agents' simplices of mixed strategies. Theorem 3 gives a closed form formula for the density of these factor measures. These measures are shown to be highly concentrated near the barycenters. (E) Numerical computation of the mean number of equilibria is simple to program, and feasible for fairly large games. (The time consuming step is Monte Carlo approximation of the mean absolute value of a random square matrix with as many rows and columns as the dimension of the space of mixed strategies, which is the total number of pure strategies less the number of agents.) We present various computational results which, in addition to their intrinsic interest, suggest various monotonicity conjectures concerning the relationship between the numbers of pure strategies for the agents and the mean number of equilibria.
The remainder of this introduction discusses various conceptual points related to this work. The next section introduces enough of the model and the methods to allow us to state the key result, and to discuss various implications. The remainder of the paper will be described at the end of that section.
Other sciences (e.g. chemistry) describe notions of equilibrium in terms of solutions to equations which might have more than one solution, but the possibility of multiple equilibria is of special interest in game theory due to the doubts that surround the Nash equilibrium concept and its variants. (E.g., Luce and Rai a (1957, 104{6) and Kreps (1990, 28{36) .) There is, of course, a very large literature describing how forces tending in the direction of equilibrium might operate. (E.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , Weibull (1995) ). Such theories might depend on computing the entire set of Nash equilibria, in which case the complexity of the computation is naturally related to the number of solutions. More commonly, equilibrium is thought of as a rest point, and perhaps an attractor, of a dynamic adjustment process, in which case the number of equilibria gives a measure of the complexity of the terrain that must be traversed if the process is to arrive at some equilibrium. Experimental literature provides a strong motivation for thinking about equilibration carefully, since in practice it is far from always the case that equilibrium is, in any sense, achieved. We will not discuss these literatures in any detail, but merely note that with respect to almost all such theorizing, the plausibility of mechanisms that might lead to Nash equilibrium declines rapidly as the complexity of the game increases.
Our approach to thinking about the complexity of normal form game theory is closely related to the formal measures of computational complexity studied in computer science. In order to be theoretically interesting, measures of the time or memory requirements of an algorithm should be independent of the particular machine on which the algorithm is run. For this reason the most intensively studied measures of complexity are quite coarse. Perhaps the best known distinction in computer science is between algorithms whose running times grow at a rate that is bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the input, in contrast with those whose time or memory requirements are bounded below by exponential functions of the input size. An important method in such analysis is to derive lower bounds on asymptotic complexity by simply counting the number of steps { 2 { required to print the output.
Worst case running times are much more extensively studied than mean running times, not because they are thought to be of greater interest, but rather because of greater tractability. In order to study mean running times one must rst of all settle on a probability distribution on the space of problems of a certain \size," or satisfying a certain combinatoric description. Usually the distribution that is most tractable, or otherwise most natural mathematically, is the focus of greatest interest, but this distribution can be criticized as \unrealistic." (For a concrete instance consider that in rather few of the actual applications of sorting algorithms is it the case that all orderings of the inputs are equiprobable.) Mathematically, the choice of distribution in this paper is justi ed by the fact that it is the unique measure satisfying natural and powerful symmetry conditions, by the tractability of the analysis given here and in McLennan (1999) , and by the apparent lack of any plausible alternative. We make no claim concerning the \realism" of this distribution as a model of the probability distribution of games occurring \in nature." Indeed, a large fraction of the games of interest to social scientists are artifacts of law, custom, or other forms of human design. It is natural to expect that designers of games would often feel that a simple and unambiguous equilibrium analysis was essential, and our results might sensibly be viewed as information related to the severity of this constraint.
For worst case analysis it often su ces to compute the running time of a particular instance of the problem, or to extract a worst case bound by patching together worst case estimates for di erent steps of the procedure, with each subsidiary bound possibly derived from the consideration of some well chosen instance of the problem. In contrast, the study of mean running times requires the analyst to control the entire space of problem instances, and to integrate over this space. This has proved possible only in a rather small subset of the computational problems and algorithms for which worst case analysis has been tractable. (Smale (1983) is an application to the simplex algorithm for linear programming.) Fortuitously, we are able to apply the methods in the literature on the distribution of roots of random polynomials (cf. Edelman and Kostlan (1995) ) to the problems presented by normal form games. For several reasons the corresponding questions for extensive form game theory seem less tractable.
The Model and the Main Result
We now describe the model and just enough of our methods to allow the formula for the mean number of equilibria to be stated. Brie y, we adopt the standard setting of normal form game theory: there are nitely many agents, each of whom has a nonempty nite set of pure strategies. Our model of a random game is given by the uniform distribution on the cartesian product of the unit spheres in the spaces of utilities for each agent. Our goal is to compute the expected number of Nash equilibria, for a given support. From a technical point of view, the main novelty is that we place mixed strategies in the positive orthant of the unit sphere, instead of the unit simplex.
The Given Data
Fix a number n 1 of agents, and x nite, nonempty sets of pure strategies { 3 { S 1 ; : : : ; S n . This information determines a normal form. The set of pure strategy vectors is S := S 1 : : : S n : Nash equilibria may be classi ed by the strategies that are assigned positive probability. Fix a support T = (T 1 ; : : : ; T n ), where, for each i = 1; : : : ; n, ; 6 = T i := ft 0 i ; t 1 i ; : : : ; t p i i g S i :
Let T := T 1 : : : T n S be the pure strategy vectors whose components are in the support.
The Model of a Random Game
For the given normal form a normal form game is obtained by specifying a utility for each agent, where the space of relevant utilities is (IR S ) , the dual of IR S . We will write either y(z) or hy;zi to denote the evaluation of a linear functional y 2 (IR S ) at z 2 IR S .
Endowing IR S and (IR S ) with the standard inner products and associated norms, let M := M 1 : : : M n ; where each M i is the unit sphere (IR S ) . In general, whenever X is a C 1 submanifold of a Euclidean space, vol X ( ) (or simply vol( ) if there is no ambiguity) denotes the measure corresponding to the notion of volume derived from the inner product of the ambient space. When vol(X) is nite, the uniform distribution on X is the probability measure U X := vol X ( )=vol X (X). The model of a random game studied here is given by U M .
For any vector of utilities u = (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) with u i 6 = 0 for each i, the set of Nash equilibria is the same as the set of Nash equilibria for the vector of normalized utilities (u 1 =ku 1 k;:::;u n =ku n k) 2 M. For our purposes, therefore, any model of a random game, by which we mean a distribution on ((IR S ) ) n that assigns no probability to the set of vectors in which some agent's utility is 0, is equivalent to the distribution on M induced by this normalization. An interesting model that is equivalent to U M is that the payo s of the various agents at the various pure strategy vectors are i.i.d. normal random variables.
Mixed Strategies and Expected Payo s
Variants and generalizations of the usual notion of a mixed strategy for agent i will be drawn from IR S i , whose elements are typically denoted by ; 0 ; : : :. Elements We will not make a notational distinction between a pure strategy s i 2 S i and the corresponding unit vector in IR S i .
{ 4 {
To compute expected utilities we need to describe the probability distribution on pure strategy vectors induced by a vector of mixed strategies. This is a product measure, and it is computed by the multilinear function (N3) i is in the interior of the positive orthant of IR T i for all i. (N4) for all i the sum of the components of i is one. Note that if one of (N1), (N2), or (N3) is satis ed by u and , then, for any positive scalars 1 ; : : : ; n , it also holds for u and ( 1 1 ; : : : ; n n ). Mathematically it is most natural to think of one of the roots we are counting as a cartesian product of rays emanating from the origin in the various spaces IR T i . While (N4) is conceptually natural, of course, for our work here it is only one method of selecting a canonical point from such a product of rays. As we proceed into the analysis it will become abundantly clear that a di erent \normalization," the requirement that each i lie in the unit sphere in IR T i , is much more fruitful mathematically. Let The quali er`strict' refers to the fact that the inequalities in (N2) are required to hold strictly. Harsanyi (1973) demonstrates that on a generic set of utilities there are only strict equilibria, so it does not a ect the expected number of equilibria if we consider only strict equilibria, as we shall in order to simplify the presentation.
{ 5 {
Let~ be the measure on N de ned, for measurable E N, bỹ
Our ambition is to study the distribution of partially mixed equilibria induced by a random game, which means that we wish to characterize the measure on N ++ obtained by restricting~ to this set. In particular,~ (N ++ ) is the mean number of partially mixed equilibria with support T.
Statement of the Main Result
The results described below refer to the following objects. 
2 ) E ? jdetZ p j : (2) The following, which is perhaps the statement of greatest conceptual interest, follows from the fact that vol(N ++ )=vol(N) = 2 ?(p+n) .
2 )
E ? jdetZ p j :
It is now possible to comment more fully on several of the points raised at the beginning of the paper, and on other matters.
Remark 1: The expectation of a sum of random variables, which may be correlated in any way whatsoever, is the sum of their expectations, so the mean number of Nash equilibria of all sorts, and the mean number of equilibria with support lying in any subset of the set of possible supports, are obtained by simple addition of the quantities considered in the results above.
Remark 2: Harsanyi (1973) shows that, for almost all u, all Nash equilibria are regular (4) , and consequently survive almost all the criteria for eliminating some Nash equilibria that are developed in the re nements literature. (Cf. van Damme (1987) .) Perhaps the main exception is the re nement that excludes equilibria with index ?1. (Generically each equilibrium has an index that may be either 1 or ?1, and the sum of these over all equilibria is 1; cf. Gul, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1993) .) It is not apparent how one might use the methods developed here to compute the expected number of equilibria with index 1 on a support-by-support basis, but since, generically, the indices of the equilibria sum to one, the mean number of Nash equilibria with index ?1 will be one less than the mean number of equilibria of index 1, so both of these means are known once we know the mean number of Nash equilibria of both sorts.
Remark 3: The natural interpretation, that Proposition 2.1 characterizes the distribution of totally mixed Nash equilibria of the truncated game obtained by eliminating strategies in the sets S i n T i , while Proposition 2.2 gives the probability that such an equilibrium is a partially mixed equilibrium of the original game, is correct in the following technical sense. The distribution on games for the strategy sets T 1 ; : : : ; T n obtained from the given (4) A Nash equilibrium is regular if it is strict and is a regular point of the function taking 2 N to the vector with components u i ( jt j i ) ? u i ( jt 0 i ) (i = 1; : : : ; n; j = 1; : :: ; p i ).
{ 7 { distribution by taking the restrictions of the (random) linear functionals u i 2 (IR S ) to IR T IR S is equivalent, in the sense discussed in x2.2, to the given distribution for our model of a random game with pure strategy sets T 1 ; : : : ; T n .
Remark 4: Pure strategy equilibria correspond to the case p 1 = : : : = p n = 0, so that each T i is a singleton. Considering rst the possibility that the sets S i n T i are all empty, we see that the correctness of (2) Summing over all vectors of pure strategies, the expected number of pure Nash equilibria is seen to be one. These results hold somewhat more generally, namely whenever the payo s for the various agents at the various pure strategy vectors are i.i.d. random variables whose common distribution has no mass points, since jS i j ?1 is then the probability that agent i's component of a pure strategy vector is a best response to that vector. These results are due to Dresher (1970) and have been extended by Powers (1990) and Stanford (1995) to the point where the distribution of the number of pure Nash equilibria is quite well understood.
Remark 5: McKelvey and McLennan (1997) show that \p i P h6 =i p h for all i" is a necessary and su cient condition for there to exist open sets of payo s for which there are totally mixed Nash equilibria. Here this corresponds to the fact that (with probability one)Z p has a p i p i submatrix of zeros, so that det(Z p ) = 0 when p i > p=2.
Remark 6: We now consider the case of n = 2 agents. From the last remark it follows that the expected number of equilibria is 0 unless p 1 = p 2 . When p 1 = p 2 , for generic utilities the equations expressing agent 1's indi erence between all strategies in T 1 will determine a 1-dimensional linear subspace of IR T 2 , and similarly with agents reversed. By virtue of the symmetry conditions developed in the next two sections, the \probability" that each subspace will intersect the positive orthant is 2 ?p , and we arrive at the conclusion that the expected number of Nash equilibria with support T is 2 ?p r(p 1 ; jS 1 n T 1 j) r(p 2 ; jS 2 n T 2 j):
Various analytic facts concerning the function r are presented in Appendix A. The remainder of the paper has the following organization. The next three sections discuss the results of computations of the mean number of totally mixed equilibria and the mean number of Nash equilibria of all sorts. Two agent games are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents numerical ndings concerning the mean number of Nash equilibria for games with more than two agents, with special attention to conjectures suggested by the calculations. Section 5 describes related mathematical work that implies that 2 ?p times the square root of the maximal number of totally mixed equilibria is a lower bound on the expected number of totally mixed equilibria. Sections 6 and 7 prove Theorem 1 by { 8 { establishing Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Section 8 analyzes the distribution of equilibrium vectors of mixed strategies in the usual cartesian product of simplices that is implied by Theorem 1.
Section 5 through 7 must be read in sequence. Otherwise the various sections and Appendix A are logically independent, and may be read with understanding in any order.
Two Person Games
The further study of the mean number (3) of equilibria for two agent games is a matter of studying the function r. Appendix A collects a variety of results concerning this function, including two lower bounds, but while these have some interest, they are not powerful enough to give information concerning the mean number of Nash equilibria of all sorts, which is obtained by summing (3) This \improves" the lower bound of one given by the Nash existence theorem, but just barely.
Since theoretical methods are so unproductive, computation provides the best sense of how the expected number of equilibria grows with the numbers of pure strategies. Let (jS 1 j;jS 2 j) be the expected number of Nash equilibria of all sorts, and let j (jS 1 j;jS 2 j) (1 j minfjS 1 j;jS 2 jg) be the expected number of equilibria in which both players mix over j pure strategies. Tables 1, 2, 3 , and 4 present the values of j for j = 2; 3; 4; 5, respectively, and Table 5 presents the values of . We will describe certain regularities exhibited by the total number of equilibria, remarking as we go along on how the data shown in Tables 1-4 does and does not share the properties of its aggregation in Table 5 .
The most obvious feature of Table 5 , and perhaps the most important, is the observation that the expected number of Nash equilibria is increasing in jS 1 j and jS 2 j. Monotonicity appears to also be a property of the functions j . There is a striking contrast between the { 9 { simplicity and fundamental character of this property of the data, on the one hand, and the di culty of extracting enough information about r to be able to prove that this is true in general. Examining second di erences, in all cases examined to date it is the case that (Here the whole is simpler than the parts of which it is the sum: for xed m 2 , j ( ; m 2 ) may be an S-shaped function, as, for instance, in the m 2 = 4 column of Table 5 .) That is, if the number of strategies for one player is held xed while the number for the other increases, the expected number of equilibria increases at a decreasing rate. is always positive. (The analogous property of j fails when j = 2.) That is, as one increases the numbers of strategies for both agents, the expected number of equilibria increases at an increasing rate. While this may be, a more subjective reaction to Table 5 is that the rate of acceleration is mild over a fairly broad range. For the`mixed' second di erence, all experience to date is consistent with the conjecture that so that has this property by virtue of being the sum of the j . That is, the rate at which the number of equilibria increases with m 2 is an increasing function of m 1 .
All computations to date are consistent with the conjecture that, for all j, the \di- This means that for any total number of pure strategies for the two agents, the expected nunber of equilibria will be greater if the strategies are divided more equally between the two agents. Table 5 { 13 {
Games with More than Two Agents
This section presents computational results pertaining to games with more than two agents. For such games the integral in the formula presented in Theorem 1 is estimated using Monte Carlo methods. Since the standard deviation of the estimate is proportional to the inverse of the square root of the sample size, it is impractical to strive for the sort of precision that results from the numerical integration methods used to generate the estimates presented in the last section. In this section all results are accompanied with standard errors, and while it is still possible to get a clear sense of the general properties of the means, it is not possible to attain the same degree of con dence, nor is it possible to discern whether the means grow with the steadiness apparent in Table 5 .
Properties of the Means
In Section 3 we identi ed the following properties of the mean number of Nash equilibria (summing over all supports) which we rephrase as hypotheses pertaining to games with arbitrary numbers of players:
(H1) The expected number of Nash equilibria is increasing when the number of strategies for any agent increases, holding the numbers of strategies for the other agents xed. (H2) If the number of strategies for one player increases while the numbers of strategies for the other players are held xed, the expected number of equilibria increases at a decreasing rate. (H3) As one increases the numbers of strategies for two agents by the same amount, holding the numbers of strategies for the other agents xed, the expected number of equilibria increases at an increasing rate. (H4) The increase in the mean number of equilibria resulting from an increase of one agent's number of strategies by one is an increasing function of the numbers of strategies of the other agents. (H5) If the numbers of strategies for two agents di er by at least two, then increasing by one the number of strategies of the agent with fewer strategies, while decreasing by one the number of strategies of the agent with more (holding the numbers of strategies of all other agents xed) increases the expected number of equilibria. Tables 6, 7 , and 8 present the estimates for, respectively, three person games in which one agent has two and three pure strategies, and four person games in which two of the agents each have two pure strategies. Note that exact versions of these tables would be symmetric across the diagonal.
Support for hypothesis (H1) is very strong, both within each table, and comparing Table 6 to the corresponding entries in Tables 7 and 8 . On the other hand, the computational evidence is pretty strongly contrary to (H2), especially in the right hand columns (and bottom rows) of Tables 7 and 8 . Hypothesis (H3) asserts that as we proceed along a diagonal path in the tables from upper left to lower right, the rate of increase should accelerate, and indeed this seems to be the case, in the sense that the estimates in the tables conform to it in every instance. Hypothesis (H4) is also strongly supported, with no violations in any one of the tables, and increasing di erences are also observed in compar-{ 14 { ing Table 6 with Table 7 . Insofar as a three person game may viewed as a four person game in which one of the agents is a \dummy," in the sense of having a single pure strategy, (H4) also predicts that Table 8 should have larger rst di erences than both Table 6 and  Table 7 , as is the case. Hypothesis (H5) is in accord with every diagonal from lower left to upper right in the tables, and also in the sense that each entry of Table 8 is larger than the corresponding entry of Table 7 .
Summarizing, Hypotheses (H1) and (H3)-(H5) are supported by the numerical calculations, while Hypotheses (H2) is refuted. Table 9 displays the mean numbers of Nash equilibria for games in which all agents have the same number of pure strategies. In addition to the subjective sense of very rapid growth of complexity, two points are of interest. First, for entries toward the lower right the means generally exceed the number of pure strategy vectors times the number of agents. Since the latter quantity is the number of payo s in the game, it appears that the average number of Nash equilibria grows more rapidly than this measure of the \size" of the game. Second, the table clearly conveys the impression that the mean number of equilibria is greater when a large number of agents each have a small number of pure strategies than when the two numbers are reversed. As mentioned above, we may view a game with n players as a game with n 0 > n players where n 0 ?n of the players are dummies with a single pure stragegy. Viewed in this light, this observation is additional evidence for hypotheses (H5). 
The Expected Number of Totally Mixed Equilibria
We turn to the study of the expected number of totally mixed equilibria, so that throughout this section we assume that T i = S i for all i. By virtue of Lemma A.3, the factors r(a; b) in (2) are unity. Analytically, our focus is the expectation of the absolute value of the determinant ofZ p . We will describe related work that leads to a relationship between the mean number of totally mixed equilibria and the square root of the maximal number. The resulting lower bounds on the mean are to some extent more tractable than the formula of Theorem 1, and in particular we are able to give a sense in which it can be proven that the expected number of totally mixed equilibria grows exponentially as the game becomes large.
Our discussion begins at a high level of generality, with a result from the theory of sparse systems of polynomial equations. We will work with polynomials in the variables x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x r ). For an exponent vector a 2 N r let x a denote the monomial x a 1 1 ; : : : ; x a r r . A sparse system of polynomials is given by specifying supports A 1 ; : : : ; A p N r , where each A k is nonempty and nite, the interpretation being that we are studying the polynomial equation systems f(x) = (f 1 (x); : : : ; f p (x)) = 0 where, for k = 1; : : : ; p, f k (x) = P a2A k f ka x a is a polynomial with support contained in A k . For k = 1; : : : ; p let H k := IR A k be the space of real coe cient vectors f k = (f ka ) a2A k , and let H = H 1 : : : H p :
Sparse systems have been studied very intensively in recent years, in part because computational advances have led to a situation in which algorithmic exploitation of sparsity has practical applications, but also in large part because of the following theorem of Bernshtein (1975) and the methods used to prove it. The Newton polytope of f k is the convex polytope Q k = con(A k ) IR r . Assume that there are as many equations as unknowns: r = p. The mixed volume of Q 1 ; : : : ; Q p , which was rst de ned and studied by Minkowski, and which we denote by MV(Q 1 ; : : : ; Q p ), may be de ned to be the coe cient In recognition of closely related work (Kushnirenko (1975) , Khovanski (1978) ) the generic number of roots is sometimes called the BKK bound.
We say that the sparse system is multihomogeneous if the following description is satis ed: the variables in x are grouped in n blocks (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ), where y i = (y i0 ; y i1 ; : : : ; y ip i ), and, for a given p n matrix of nonnegative integers, each A k represents the set of polynomials that are homogeneous of degree ki as a function of y i , i = 1; : : : ; n. If (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ) is a root of the multihomogeneous system f = 0, then, for any scalars 1 ; : : : ; n , the point ( 1 y 1 ; : : : ; n y n ) is also a solution, so it is natural to look for solutions in N := S p 1 : : : S p n , where each N i := S p i is the unit sphere in IR p k +1 . An even more natural solution space is the cartesian product P := P 1 : : : P n of the projective spaces P i = P(IR p i +1 ), which are obtained from the N i by identifying antipodal points. If the equation f(x) = 0 holds at any of the 2 n points in N identi ed with z 2 P, then, by virtue of multihomogeneity, it holds at all the others as well, and we will follow an abuse of notation that is standard in algebraic geometry, writing`f(z) = 0' to express this condition, and describing z as a root of f, even though f is not a function de ned on P.
We say that this system is exactly determined if there are, e ectively, as many equations as degrees of freedom: p = p 1 + : : : + p n = r ? n:
Henceforth we consider only this case. Note that, with this restriction, the system is determined by p := (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) and . In applying Bernshtein's theorem to multihomogeneous systems the natural procedure is to pass to the \demultihomogenized" system obtained by specializing the variables y 10 ; : : : ; y n0 to unity. This is the sparse system whose supports are the projections of A 1 ; : : : ; A p to the space of the variables y 11 ; : : : ; y 1p 1 ; : : : ; y n1 ; : : : ; y np n :
Let BKK(p; ) be the generic number of complex roots of the demultihomogenized system, as given by Bernshtein's theorem.
The permanent (e.g., Egorychev (1996) ) of a p p matrix D with entries d km is de ned to be per(
(Here S p is the symmetric group, that is, the group of permutations of f1;:::;pg.) This formula di ers from the one de ning the determinant in that here each summand is not multiplied by (?1) sgn( ) , and the permanent has several properties that are analogous to those of the determinant, such as multilinearity and the possibility of expanding by minors along any row or column. Let (p; ) be the p p matrix whose rst p 1 columns are the rst column of , whose next p 2 columns are the second column of , and so forth. The following results are proved in McLennan (1998) ; the formula expressing the generic number of roots in terms of the permanent can be derived by expanding vol(Q ), and the two recursive formulas are derived by expanding the permanent by minors along a row or column respectively. Both of these inequalities hold strictly if and only if there is more than one i with p i > 0 and ki > 0.
In preparation for the next result we ask when it is the case that BKK(p; ) can be computed by repeated applications of this inequality in which the RHS has only one nonzero term, so that the relation holds with equality. We say that the pair (p; ) is simply reducible if the following inductive de nition is satis ed: there is some k for which there is at most one i with n i > 0, ki > 0, and BKK(p ? e i ; ?k ) > 0, and if p > 1 we require that for this i, (p ? e i ; ?k ) is also simply reducible. Note that 1 2 (p; ) = (p; ) when each ij is either 0 or 1, as is the case with (p). In view of Proposition 5.1, the upper bound given by the last result reduces to BKK(p) E(p)| the generic number of complex roots is at least as large as the mean number of real roots| which is already obvious, of course. For normal form games, therefore, the signi cance of the last result is entirely a matter of the lower bound on E(p). In general, our methods provide upper bounds on the mean number of totally mixed equilibria only through the nding that the roots of the relevant system are uniformly distributed on N, so that the fraction of them lying in N ++ is obtained by dividing by 2 p+n .
The main advantage of the inequality above over the formula given by the Corollary to Theorem 1 is that it is combinatoric in nature. Going further in the direction of trading accuracy for transparency and ease of evaluation, there are the following bounds, which are rather crude, but useful nonetheless. They are derived by an inductive argument based on the recursive formulas in Proposition 5.1. Q n i=1 r(p i ; jS i n T i j) p
(n ? i) p i : McKelvey and McLennan (1997) show that for any normal form it is possible to nd utilities for which there are as many regular totally mixed Nash equilibria as are allowed by { 24 { Bernshtein's theorem. (McLennan (1998) extends this result to general multihomogeneous systems.) In particular, the mean number of totally mixed Nash equilibria is greater than or equal to 2 ?p times the square root of the maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2 has a variety of implications for the asymptotic growth rates of the mean number of equilibria. To begin with, we remark that the growth of the vector p must be controlled rather carefully. In particular, if we allow one agent's set of pure strategies to grow while holding the numbers of pure strategies for the other agents xed, then eventually BKK(p) = E(p) = 0. Consequently the interesting questions concern the rates of growth as the numbers of pure strategies for at least two agents become large. Since q Q n?1 i=1 (n ? i) p i depends only on p 1 ; : : : ; p n?2 , this quantity is constant if we allow the numbers of pure strategies for two agents to increase together, while the numbers of pure strategies for all other agents are held xed. In general, if we x the numbers of pure strategies for some set of agents, letting the numbers of pure strategies for the other agents increase, the quantity Q n?1 i=1 (n ? i) p i is a constant times what it would be if the xed agents were not present at all. The lower bound on E(p) has the greatest force when all agents have the same number of pure strategies: p 1 = : : : = p n = p=n. In this case the mean number of equilibria is bounded below by
p=2n :
For integral n the quantity (n ? 1)!=2 2n exceeds one if and only if n 12, so that the number of equilibria grows exponentially in this case. On the other hand, when n 3 the upper bound in Theorem 2 implies that mean number of totally mixed equilibria is less than or equal to one. For n between 4 and 11 we are unable to determine whether the asymptotic growth of the mean number of totally mixed equilibria is exponential.
The Proof of Proposition 2.1
This and the next section constitute the proof of Theorem 1. In this section we explain how Proposition 2.1 follows from Proposition 5.2. We begin with two issues that are easily dealt with.
As Remark 3 pointed out, the measure is una ected by the sets S i nT i . This means that, in proving Proposition 2.1, there is no loss of generality in assuming that T i = S i , and we shall do so throughout this section.
The formulas given by Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 5.2 di er by a factor of 2 n that arises from the fact that is the measure induced on N while is a measure on P. Let be the measure on N de ned, for measurable E N, by
Letting : N ! P be the natural map from N to P, for E N such that the restriction of to E is injective we clearly have (E) = (E), so ( ?1 (F)) = 2 n (F) for any measurable F P. Clearly Proposition 2.1 follows from Proposition 5.2 once we show that = . tion on M by this map was the uniform distribution, we would be done, but in fact this is almost certainly not the case (5) . In particular, the coe cients of i1 (u; ); : : : ; ip i (u; ) are all a ected by u i (t 0 i ; ), so it would be quite surprising if they were distributed independently.
To handle this problem we pass to a more fundamental view of the two random systems of equations. Let (E.g., Guillemin and Pollack (1965) .)
The ber over 2 N is V := fu 2 M : (u; ) 2 V g:
It will sometimes be convenient to abuse notation by not distinguishing explicitly between V and ?1 2 ( ) M N. The ber over is a cartesian product of subspheres of the spheres M i given by the equations de ning V , so its topology is independent of , and the following result is therefore quite unsurprising. In mathematical literature it is customary to assert a claim such as the following without proof, since to argue the point in detail would be a longwinded and mundane a air, and we shall follow suit (6) . (6) It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that the \group" of the bration may be taken to be the group G de ned below, and that a suitable atlas of coordinate functions (this terminology, and the de nition of \ bration" we are appealing to, are from Steenrod (1951) ) is given by maps of the following sort: given The essential hypotheses implying this formula are that M and N are C 1 Riemannian manifolds, and V is a C 1 submanifold of M N with respect to which 2 is a C 1 bration. To obtain some intuition for this formula, consider the linear case which, as usual, is thought of as approximating the situation when Z is \small." That is, let M and N be Euclidean spaces with dimM dimN, let V is a linear subspace of M N with dimV = dimM, let 1 and 2 be the restrictions of the projections, and assume that 2 is surjective. It is possible to pick coordinates for M with respect to which the formula is, by direct computation, a consequence of the change of variables formula. A proof for the linear case that does not refer to a coordinate system is given by Shub and Smale (1993 We now show that the inner integral on the RHS of (5) does not depend on by using the symmetry that we built into the mathematical apparatus by displacing the space of mixed strategies for each agent from the unit simplex to the positive orthant of the unit sphere. We will be concerned with various actions of the group Of course N is an invariant of this action|that is, gN = N for all g 2 G|and there is an action of G on N given by restriction. We now describe a variety of actions of G that are \complementary" to this action in the sense of the following result. Proof: Identifying t 2 T with the correponding n-tuple of unit basis vectors in IR T 1 : : : IR T n , f (t) : t 2 T g is the standard basis for IR T . For any g 2 G a linear transformation from IR T to itself (which we also denote by g) is determined by the condition g( (t)) = (gt) for all t 2 T, and since the functions 7 ! g( ( )) and 7 ! (g ) are both multilinear and agree on a cartesian product of bases for the spaces IR T i , they must agree everywhere. For g 1 ; g 2 2 G and t 2 T we have (g 1 g 2 )( (t)) = (g 1 g 2 t) = g 1 ( (g 2 t)) = g 1 (g 2 ( (t))); so we have de ned a group action, and of course is equivariant with respect to it.
To show that this is an action by orthogonal transformations we demonstrate that h (g ); (g 0 )i = h ( ); ( 0 )i for all g 2 G and ; 0 2 IR T 1 : : : IR T n . When g = (g 1 ; : : : ; g n ) has only one component g i di ering from the identity we view IR T as a cartesian product of copies of IR T i indexed by T ?i , so that g i acts on each copy in transforming ( ) to (g ). The inner products on both sides are obtained by summing over the copies, so the claim follows from the fact that g i is an orthogonal transformation. The general case is obtained by applying this special case repeatedly.
The last result actually plays no role in subsequent events. It was included since its proof is simpler than the (omitted) proof of the following, by virtue of greater symmetry, even though the underlying ideas are the same. For any m the action of the orthogonal group O(IR m+1 ) on the unit sphere S m is transitive. As the cartesian product of transitive actions, the action of G on N is also transitive. To show that the inner integral in the formula above is independent of we apply the following invariances:
? (gu;g ) = g(? (u; ) ); A(gu; g ) = g A(u; ) g ?1 ; A (gu; g ) = g A (u; ) g ?1 :
We present no proofs, since for most readers the underlying ideas are familiar, and at worst these are suitable exercises, since only straightforward linear algebra is involved.
If Z V is open and invariant under the action of G (that is, gZ = Z for all g 2 G) then the map (u; ) 7 ! (gu; g ) is an isometry between V \ Z and V g \ Z, so the change of variables formula, followed by application of the invariances above and elementary properties of the determinant, yields , and, by the last result, the integrand depends only on certain other coordinates of u. The next step is to simplify by applying a change of variables that maps the subset of M i to a cartesian product, with one factor being the space of the irrelevant variables, whose e ect on the integral reduces to multiplication by the volume of this space. Although the next two lemmas are notationally cumbersome, the underlying idea is simple. The complex appearance is due entirely to the complexity of the intended application's environment. 
The Derived Density on the Simplex
We have seen that the distribution of mixed strategy vectors induced by Nash equilibrium is uniform when mixed strategy vectors are parameterized to lie in N ++ . In this section we study the corresponding distribution on the traditional parameterization of the space of mixed strategy vectors, the cartesian product of simplices. The uniform distribution on N ++ is the product of the uniform distributions on the spaces N ++ i . Each of these factors induces a measure on the unit simplex in IR T i via radial projection, and the induced distribution on the cartesian product of the simplices is the product of these induced measures. We aim at characterizing the induced measure on the unit simplex in IR T i .
To simplify the exposition, and avoid repeated references to an arbitrary agent, we Table 11 { 45 {
